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**THE UNITED STATES VIS-A-VIS PERU:
A STRATEGY FOR DEFEATING THEIR COMMUNIST
INSURGENCY**

BY

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
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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
ABSTRACT		
I	US NATIONAL STRATEGY	1
II	SITUATION The Insurgency The Government The Military	3
III	OPTIONS Military Reform Governmental Reform	12
IV	RECOMMENDATIONS	22
V	CONCLUSIONS	28
	NOTES	30
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	

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
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strategic objectives, as they apply to Peru, are valid; and will
discuss the avenues which the United States has to assist Peru in
combatting its' communist insurgency.



CHAPTER I - US NATIONAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Peru is currently facing three powerful threats to its' survival as a democratic government: the drug cartels; a bankrupt economy (coupled with a government in which the people have little faith); and a Maoist based subversive insurgency (the Sendero Luminoso/Shining Path). Although each domain is unique, they interrelate to create a situation easily given to hopelessness.

Past US policies and doctrine for Latin America have influenced and defined US interests and actions in Peru. Throughout American history, the United States has been willing to help people maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose totalitarian regimes. Latin America has seen the Monroe Doctrine, the Good Neighbor Policy, the Truman Doctrine, the Alliance For Progress, the Mature Partnership, the Nixon Doctrine, Carter's "human rights" doctrine and now, largely driven by the new National Security Decision Directive on Narcotics and National Security, the Bush policy.

Perhaps the most grievous error the US has repeatedly made in Latin America is to view all countries to the south as one homogeneous group and to attempt to create one overriding policy that would serve the needs of US security interests throughout the region, as if it were one country. Peru is not El Salvador any more than France is Germany. In formulating an individual



policy dealing with Peru, the US has two choices. The first is to argue that Peru is not important enough to warrant any effort that would be necessary to help change the existing, overwhelming conditions that threaten democracy and society in general within the country. The second option is to argue that the US's strategic objectives as they apply to Peru are valid and must be pursued.

United States interests in Peru take four basic forms: (1) promoting democratic institutions, (2) encouraging economic development, (3) combating terrorism and (4) eliminating cocaine production and trafficking.¹ The cornerstone of US national strategy is the promotion and preservation of free institutions, of political democracy and a market oriented economy.²

The importance of the "drug war" in the national conscience cannot be exaggerated. Considering Peru is the largest producer of coca in the world, the US needs to recognize the strategic importance of working with the Peruvian government to further US security interests in fighting drugs. In order to be effective, the Peruvian government must desire the assistance and be in a position to accept it. Should the Sendero Luminoso successfully overthrow the democratically elected government of Peru, American and international aid of any kind will be rejected and any chances of influencing Peru in combatting coca production will be lost.



CHAPTER II - SITUATION

Despite being a country rich in natural resources, Peru is a country where poverty is absolute. The disparity between economic levels is further heightened by class and race discrimination and geographic isolation. There is little, if any, upward mobility in Peruvian society. The Andean Indian peasants are a majority in Peru, and yet they have been exploited for centuries. Physically separated from the populated coastal plain by the Andes, the interior of the country has been developmentally ignored, leaving the small Andean villages and towns to become almost enclaves of their own.

The Insurgency

While Peru lays claim to having two communist insurgencies operating within the country, by far the most dangerous is the Sendero Luminoso, which was founded in 1970 by Abimael Guzman. Then a professor of philosophy at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, Guzman has been the primary force behind the movement's ideological development, it's spiritual head, and it's chief strategist in a protracted war against the government of Peru.

At the inception of the Sendero Luminoso, the organization looked little different from the scores of other radical student-based organizations that had emerged and receded among Peru's politicized university community. The movement was an amalgamation of Maoist theory combined with the "native



socialism" espoused by Jose Carlos Mariategui, a Peruvian intellectual who was responsible for the initial development of the Peruvian Socialist Party in the 1920s. Guzman fused the peasant-based revolutionary concepts of Mao and the theories of Mariategui, whose writings argued that the basis of Peruvian socialism lay in the structure and norms of the pre-Colombian peasant community. The revolution that would bring these peasants (and eventually workers) a new state would logically begin among Peru's traditional Indian populations, the direct descendants of the country's socialist tradition.³

In a modification of Mao's three-phased theory of protracted war, Guzman has developed a five-point program for victory through which the revolution must pass before Sendero succeeds in defeating the Lima government. These are (1) agitation and armed propaganda; (2) sabotage against Peru's socioeconomic system; (3) the generalization of the guerrilla struggle; (4) the conquest and expansion of the revolution's support base and the strengthening of the guerrilla army; and (5) general civil war, the siege of the cities, and the final collapse of state power.⁴ Sendero claims that during the 1980s, it has accomplished the first three objectives and is now waging phase four of the struggle.

In the early years the movement consolidated leadership, recruited its initial cadre and made its opening efforts to mobilize a base of support among the Indian population and the academic community. When Guzman became the personnel director of



the university in 1971, he was able to control the faculty selection process and oversee the indoctrination and recruitment of a generation of student supporters. Consequently, the movement spread.

By the mid 1970s, Guzman's base of support had begun to extend to establish a core network of political activists. Sendero's success in establishing a national base of operations was due as much to the lack of a strong official presence throughout much of rural Peru as it was to the group's efforts to solicit popular support. It moved beyond Huamanga to begin recruiting among the highland Indian communities and spread beyond Ayacucho, with the growth of cells in surrounding areas and eventually to the slum dwellers of Lima. The movement proved extremely adept at using Peru's rural traditions and the Indian village system to its advantage. The highlanders are physically, culturally, and psychologically remote from life in modern Peru and suffer from a racism that has been easily exploited by the insurgency. Additionally, their closed village societies provide a source of security to the insurgency, providing timely intelligence of security force movements and tight ideological control within the community. Where Sendero has met with resistance, its methods have been quick and brutal, in some cases massacring an entire village for refusing to cooperate or for cooperating with the national authorities. Terror is a tool of the Sendero.

With great patience and careful infiltration, the Sendero



Luminoso was able to establish an highly organized, disciplined network of supporters and contacts before moving against the government. Though it suffered some high casualties during the early 1980s (perhaps accelerating phases too fast), it has rebounded stronger than ever. Measures to contain the insurgency have been selectively successful, but the insurgency has expanded out of its original operating area in Ayacucho to establish operations that extend from one end of the country to the other, from the slums of Peru to the Andes where it operates with little or no interference from either the police or the military.

Sendero's support base is drawn from a cross section of Peru's disenfranchised, the poor highland peasants to the large mass of urban unemployed. Originally an organization who spurned outside support and any association with the "legal left", the movement has made a clear effort in recent years to appeal to radical circles among Peru's traditional left and to infiltrate and radicalize organized labor as part of a larger program to expand its support. The movement never has solicited or received much, if any, assistance from outside Peru. In a substantial break from the group's earlier methods and isolation, the Sendero has begun to make extensive use of front groups and the publication *El Diario*. Sendero appears to be attempting to exploit Peru's still open society in its larger effort to ultimately overthrow the government. The government, for its' part, must either tolerate these attempts or compromise its' democratic ideas with some suspension of civilian rights that



might include a crack-down on the free press.

The insurgency has increasingly turned to assassination of government officials living both in the countryside and within Lima. Highly directed, these attacks seem to indicate that the movement must have some access to closely held information regarding the movements of the victims, tending to confirm Peruvian fears that Sendero has succeeded in infiltrating elements of the government, the police, and the armed forces. The selective killing of high government and defense personnel has become a standard feature of Sendero operations and has risen considerably, particularly in the last three years.

One of the most disturbing and confounding trends in the Sendero Luminoso has been its growing involvement in the drug trade. Peru's largest coca growing area, the Huallaga valley, has come under increased insurgent influence, limiting the government's ability to bring drug production under control. While the initial relationship between the insurgents and the drug growers was apparently hostile, their increasing cooperation has had important benefits for the Sendero. The insurgency provides limited protection and security for the growers from government efforts to irradiate the drug crop. In exchange, it reputedly receives between 20 and 30 million dollars a year⁵ from taxing the growers in the area. Although Sendero appears to have maintained some distance from local traffickers, rather than being co-opted by the traffickers, its Huallaga base is collocated with that of the drug trade and has benefitted from



its presence. The insurgency's ideological rigidity and evident puritanism places limits on the extent of the relationship. However, they share the government as a common enemy, and the government, by attempting to link their drug control program to the war against Sendero, has contributed to pushing the two groups closer together.

The Sendero Luminoso appears poised to enter a new phase in the movement's urban program. While still subordinate to the rural campaign, the movement has been successful in establishing an urban network, eroding popular support for the current government, mobilizing a base of mass support in the cities and pushing the government and security forces into a desperate campaign of counterterror. Indeed, the insurgency has successfully organized enclaves within the disenfranchised peasant population in Lima which are governed and administered by the Sendero. Within these areas, they appear to be providing administrative services to the population superior than the government is able to provide. With over one third of the population already in the Lima area, this new threat to the stability of the government is increasingly significant.

The Government

Democratic traditions in Peru are in their infant stages. The only three peaceful transfers of civilian democratic rule within the century have occurred since 1980. But the country has supported democratic elections and is attempting to build democratic institutions. Unfortunately, coupled with the



formidable problems facing Peru today, the democratic government is none too solid or secure. One oddly fortuitous result, however, is that the military that would have once readily stepped in to overthrow the government, does not appear to be overanxious to take on the heavy responsibility of trying to cure Peru's difficulties.

Conceivably, the most substantial problem the government has to overcome is the lack of credibility it has with the public. Endemic corruption throughout all levels of the administration, wasteful and extravagant public projects, rejection of principles of participatory governance and inept government intervention in the marketplace have characterized the government's performance and hurt its' public image.

The economy is nearly bankrupt; inflation runs at nearly the highest level in the world; an extremely high cost of living coupled with one of the lowest per capita incomes in the hemisphere robs the populace of buying power; and Peru is virtually cut off from the world financial community. More than 40% of the work force is unemployed and most Peruvians maintain basic survival through a vast informal, underground black market economy, largely influenced by narco-dollars within the nation's money supply. It is a sad fact that the drug economy may be keeping Peru economically afloat. It is Peru's only growth industry.

Health care difficulties have only added to the government's problems. Cholera has become increasingly evident in a



population which has little idea of how to prevent the spread of the disease and where health facilities are strained to the limit due to sickness and a lack of doctors and nurses. Infant mortality is double that of the rest of Latin America, while life expectancy barely passes 50 years. Malnutrition is, unfortunately, common.

As a result of increasing levels of terror from the Sendero Luminoso, refugees have besieged Lima to the point that one third of Peru's population live in the capital. The population explosion in the city has overwhelmed basic city services; water, electricity, housing, garbage collection, etc. can not keep up with this growing population. As a result of the current economic difficulties in the country, unemployment in the city is devastating, and large slums have developed around the outskirts. The government has been unable to enfranchise these people, and they are ripe for insurgent mobilization efforts.

The Military

The Peruvian military has become increasingly involved in the anti-insurgency effort as terror has spread from the Sendero. This is in large part because the government has relied almost exclusively on fielding a military response to the insurgency, rather than addressing the root, underlying political and social causes of the uprising.

For years the Peruvian military was exclusively concerned with defending its borders from foreign attack, and consequently trained and armed itself with weapons to fight those enemies.



Fighting an internal insurgency was considered to be the job of the national police and local officials. The armed forces favored external opponents and a conventional force structure to a domestic adversary and the undramatic force mix needed to wage an unconventional rural campaign. It has only been the dramatic increase in the effectiveness of the Sendero Luminoso which has altered this attitude.

The armed forces have largely fought the insurgency through the use of "emergency zones" which provide the military with the legal authorization to declare a state of emergency, suspending constitutional liberties and placing all civilian agencies under the jurisdiction of the region's designated military commander. Unfortunately, while this strategy has permitted the government to focus its limited assets against the point of greatest resistance, it has also reinforced the military's dominant role in managing the insurgency. There is little, if any, civilian cooperation in this effort. The military, for all intents and purposes, is on its own. The reports of human rights abuses by the military in these zones has only undermined government efforts to influence the areas.

The armed forces also reflect Peruvian society at large. The officer corps reflects the same racial and regional make-up as the upper and middle classes in Peruvian society. It is Spanish speaking, largely white, and urban in orientation while the enlisted ranks are largely peasants drafted from the countryside. Many enlisted men do not speak Spanish and with



very few exceptions, officers do not speak Quechua. It is not surprising that the Sendero has successfully infiltrated the military and as a result, there is distrust and division between officers and enlisted men of the armed forces.

Perhaps the most significant problem facing the Peruvian armed forces is that it has no means of systematically collecting, analyzing, and exploiting intelligence on the Sendero. This is exacerbated by the racial differences between the insurgency and the armed forces. Coupled with an overly centralized decision making process; no corpus of unconventional, small unit tactics; little ability to react quickly to guerrilla actions; and chronic problems with sustaining large numbers of forces in the field, the Peruvian armed forces are ill prepared to effectively seek out and deal with the Sendero Luminoso.⁶

CHAPTER III - OPTIONS

The United States has, essentially, two opposing options. The US could conclude that Peru is not important enough to warrant the effort or concern necessary to assist change and reform to the existing, almost overwhelming conditions facing Peru. Otherwise, it must be argued that it is in the US's strategic interest to assist in combatting Peru's serious difficulties.

As was previously discussed, it is considered in the strategic interests and objectives of the United States to support the legitimate government of Peru in its' struggle



against the communist insurgency. Additionally, with Peru as the largest producer of coca in the world, the United States must recognize the strategic importance of working with a friendly Peruvian government in their wars against insurgency and drugs. That leaves discussion of how, most effectively, to support and assist the Peruvian government and the Peruvian people to defeat the insurgency and help eliminate the root causes the lead Peruvians to participate in both the insurgency and in the international drug trade.

There are many options that can be defined within the concept of aid. It is, first, important to discuss some of the general possibilities and then pursue recommendations.

To be sure, the option of deluging the Peruvian government with money, equipment and advice, as well as significant numbers of combat troops, exists. The United States has the assets to make this an American war, rightly or wrongly. However, the American public would not support such a strategy, nor would the American Congress. Further, it is arguable and probable that this strategy would only serve to embroil the US in a Peruvian war in which it is not prepared or able to directly affect the outcome. The United States has been there before. Nor is it likely that the Peruvian government would accept such oppressive assistance or be capable of retaining administrative control over its employment. Direct, overpowering US involvement in Peru's war would be ill advised and undoubtedly, counterproductive.

In the same vein, the US could participate in (overtly or



covertly) or support a coup against the current Peruvian government and attempt to step in and literally run the government. Clearly, this would be viewed as intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and exceeding US authority and interests in the world. There is also, presently, no reason to believe that the military (the most likely source of a coup) is any better prepared to deal with Peruvian social, economic or political problems than the current democratically elected government. The military, however, can be expected to step in if the situation deteriorates to the point that the survival of Peru as a sovereign nation appears to be in jeopardy.

There have been several attempts to bring the insurgency to a negotiated conclusion during the 1980s. These efforts have either been ignored, rejected or disregarded. While the promise of a negotiated settlement has been hinted at occasionally by Guzman, "it will only come when the Peruvian government surrenders. You sign at the bargaining table only what has been confirmed on the battlefield. . . Peru, has entered a period of full-fledged ideological belligerence. The men who represent a force for change cannot come to terms or mingle, even if by accident or chance, with those who represent a force for the status quo or for regression. An historic abyss separates them. They speak a separate language and they do not have a shared sense of history."⁷ Presently, meaningful negotiation with the insurgency is not a viable option.

International support for Peruvian government efforts has



not, henceforth, been forthcoming in large amounts. Complicated by Peru's tremendous debt, the country has been virtually cut off from the international monetary and financial communities. While the present government is attempting to negotiate and deal with, for example, the International Monetary Fund, there has been little progress thus far.

Intervention or assistance from the United Nations, while plausibly welcome in Peru, is unlikely from a body stretched to the limit by crisis situations in Eastern Europe, the former USSR, Southwest Asia and even El Salvador. As the umbrella institution under which efforts to assist the Peruvian government are coordinated, it does, however, have potential. The Organization of American States (OAS) is another possibility as an umbrella organization under which assistance can be managed. Both offer the advantages of advancing or creating a coalition effort in which one or two countries are not visibly "out front", thereby soothing Peruvian national resentment against foreign intervention. In either case, the United States would not risk the adverse public perception of, once again, overtly interfering in South American internal issues unilaterally. With the growing drug problem in Europe, even NATO and the European Community have taken an interest in South American production of coca. Considering Peru's history of Spanish (European) colonialism, it would be ill advised for either organization to take any leading position in providing assistance to the Peruvian government. It is, however, very much in European interests (just as it is in US



interests) to see a government maintained and supported in Peru which is at least amenable to participating in the international community in efforts to combat drug production.

Regional assistance through other forums is an option to be explored. Although the Sendero has confined itself principally only to Peru, other Andean nations may be threatened in the future.

The institution of the Catholic Church in Latin American cultures has been extraordinary influential. While also true in Peru, the Church's position deteriorated during the last three or four decades, particularly among the lower and lower-middle classes of Peru.⁸ In the 1950s and 1960s, the Church actively fought its' ideological competitors, the Communists, and supported the government and the military. In addition, the Church is seen by many as a holdover of Spanish colonialism and its' ranks reflect the racial divisions in Peru. The Andean Indian is not likely to be a Catholic, where the city dweller is far more likely to be. The Church has become a target for the Sendero, which views it as ideologically corrupt and an impediment to the insurgency, because the Church does serve to provide an infrastructure of sorts, especially for the urban population.

Since the Sendero has singled out the Church for unusually brutal treatment, it is reasonable to assume that it must be perceived as a significant threat to their cause. For this reason, it is conceivable to postulate that providing increased



assistance in Peru through the Church, especially in the cities, might be a constructive way of combatting the insurgency (the issue of providing security to this and any assistance efforts will be dealt with subsequently).

The United States has another option is aiding Peru, although it is one fraught with controversy and not easily addressed. Cocaine demand in the US and internationally has become an vital part of Sendero's support in executing the insurgency. Any, and all, successful efforts to constrict the US and international market for cocaine will dampen the monetary support Sendero receives from participation in the drug trade.

Military Reform

The decisive factor in the struggle for Peru will be the armies' ability to provide security to the populace, and only through military reform will the Peruvian armed forces be successful. Presently the Peruvian armed forces do not demonstrate the professionalism or the skill level to present a credible threat to the insurgency. First, and foremost, they must be able to provide for the security of assistance efforts upon which a successful war against the insurgency is based.

It is important to point out here that the Peruvian military, which has not received significant Congressionally authorized US military aid for more than 20 years, is concerned about the meddlesome nature of a formal military agreement with the US. US aid (especially military) comes with the caveat that Peru must agree to close monitoring of weapons use and human



rights issues in order to qualify for the assistance. If the US truly wants to be of assistance, this policy has to end.

Peruvians watched closely as aid to El Salvador was debated repeatedly in the US, restricted and resumed. It bred distrust.

In declaring drug production and trafficking a threat to US national security, President Bush outlined a vast expansion of aid - especially military aid - to the Andean countries. Drugs are a major threat to the national security of the US and when the US is willing to spend more than a half billion dollars to combat drugs, the problem is significant. But with the certification requirement established by the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, a direct relationship exists between assistance to Peru and its performance on drug control. If the President fails to certify Peru, or if Congress disapproves the certification, the US must withhold most economic and military assistance and support for World Bank and other loans. This is counterproductive and smacks of perceived US superiority. Wedding anti-insurgency assistance to progress on anti-drug initiatives suggests that the US is only concerned about Peru in terms of the anti-drug campaign. That is not to say that assistance can't have indirectly positive impacts on joint Peruvian-US anti-narcotics efforts and counter-insurgency efforts.

Government soldiers must be able to damage Sendero forces more than they have previously been able to, while simultaneously mistreating villagers less. The army can not act like an



occupation force which then suddenly departs, leaving no security in its place. The Peruvian armed forces must understand Mao's basic concept; It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies. In order to accomplish this, the soldiers must be better organized, better trained and better paid. Here, the US can help. Corrupt officers must be relieved, terror tactics in the field must be curbed, pay for the military must be increased to alleviate the need for corruption and theft, and promotions must be based on performance, not favoritism.

New military tactics and strategies must emphasize small, hard-hitting groups of soldiers to drive deep into hostile areas and to attacks insurgent camps. They must be effective not only in battling the Sendero, but must emphasize less damage to the civilian population. This is an unconventional war and calls for unconventional tactics.

The establishment of intelligence schools and a Peruvian Military Intelligence Corps are imperative to Peruvian success. A high priority must be placed on collecting and using intelligence and tying it closely to psychological warfare operations. This will not be easy given the insular nature of the Sendero and established cultural and language barriers, but it is crucial. With good intelligence, the military will be better able to specifically target not only Sendero cells but also the leadership of the movement. The Sendero understands the importance of intelligence and infiltration and effectively uses it to their advantage. So must the armed forces. If some



personnel must learn Quechua in order to better lead troops or if Quechua speaking officers must be recruited, then so be it.

Without military reform, the army will never win the allegiance of the people. In order to gain the respect and loyalty of the people, they must work with the population to organize resistance and build a better way of life. In doing so, they will steal the most valuable asset of the guerrilla movement. The military must be forced to realize that the "center of gravity" in this conflict is the "care and feeding" or the "hearts and minds" of the peasants and the indigenous population.

Governmental Reform

Peruvian governmental reforms will have to be sufficient to improve the government's image and provide hope for the peasants, the insurgents and the insurgent supporters for whom insurrection has become a last resort in the face of ineffective government rule. Upward mobility in Peruvian society and opportunities for economic reward have to be addressed. The importance of continued democratic elections which are viewed as peaceful, fair, open and honest is paramount.

The battle for public opinion must be waged with equal vigor to the battle against the insurgency itself. The government must understand that revolutionary movements involve both political, military and moralistic objectives which are mutually supporting. Government solutions must reflect that also. Government reform and potential solutions will have to include agricultural



extension services, cash credit for peasants, barrio health clinics, new bridges and roads to connect Peru's geographically separated areas, free, compulsory elementary education (to name a few), and a governmental "psychological warfare" campaign against the insurgency that is aimed at the soft core of the Sendero movement - those who were not hard-core revolutionaries or Sendero leaders, but rather the lower levels of the movement and the mass base. The government must give the people hope that the government can be a more effective administrator for them than the insurgents and that the government can establish that which the insurgents have been trying to get by violence, without the risk of their lives.

Inspired leadership to change an already corrupt government or to maintain an honest one in the face of insurrection is not a common occurrence. This is one of Peru's most difficult challenges. No Peruvian leader has been able to successfully defeat the insurgency or implement the required economic, political or social reforms necessary to destroy the movement. This is particularly important in terms of (common) world and US perceptions that perhaps the Peruvian system is too flawed to deserve support. US efforts must emphasize the need to groom and nurture inspirational leadership.



CHAPTER IV - RECOMMENDATIONS

First and foremost, Peru must be encouraged to develop a national plan to win the contest for popular support against the Sendero Luminoso. Countering the insurgency in Peru is a matter of putting together a local (Peruvian) strategy within the framework of a regional one (Columbia, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia), getting a political consensus and setting out to accomplish the mission. Given US national interests in Peru, the question of how best to help is preeminent.

The strategy to accomplish US objectives in Peru must include economic, political, social and military initiatives, but it is essential that the Peruvian armed forces be capable of protecting its local political apparatus, cadres and supporters from enemy forces and assassins. Failure to perform this function will inevitably lead to a further breakdown of morale and discipline and failure of any initiatives, no matter how positive or well conceived.

In order to help the Peruvian armed forces provide security for administrative enterprises, the US can provide valuable contributions in the form of foreign internal defense assistance. It is imperative to point out right up front, however, that any program will be protracted, require great patience and that success cannot be measured overnight. US assistance must be predicated on the understanding that it is just that - assistance. This is a battle that must be waged and won by



Peruvians. Over commitment by the US or any foreign source will only serve to rob Peruvian society of the obligation to control and be held responsible for the success of efforts to destroy the insurgency.

Assuming that many of the reforms previously discussed have been implemented (at least conceptualized and agreed to), the Peruvian military must reorient itself from simply attempting to chase and kill guerrillas to focusing on the civilian population, thereby separating the Sendero from their support base. That effort may have to start in the very heart of Peru, in Lima. Offensive operations which will have to include fast reaction teams and staying power against major insurgent concentrations will continue (albeit reorganized), but emphasis should be placed on the security of the population and infrastructure above all else.

The significance of building secure areas from which to span out cannot be exaggerated. Whether they are called "strategic hamlets" ala Malaysia or envision a program like the Philippine EDCORP program of the 1950s (or arguably even the USMC "strategic hamlet" program in Vietnam), the military must first establish, even in Lima, areas in which reform efforts can be carried out without fear of violent reprisal from the Sendero. Professor Chris Harmon of the Naval War College referred to this principle as the "oil spot" theory,³ where hard-hitting, fast army columns are still necessary, but in the wake of battlefield victories the army does not disappear but carries out a progressive and



permanent occupation. "And with the garrison comes a different army: administrators, teachers, health workers, engineers, etc. The thrust of the strategy could not be more different from conventional war; it is the population, not the enemy army, that is the true object."¹⁰

In order to be successful, the Peruvian armed forces must expand, reorganize and reorient. They will require extensive training which the US can provide in the form of military training teams and small groups of advisors. Training in law enforcement, small - platoon level operations, mobility and night patrols, civil affairs, medical treatment, logistics, communications and intelligence (to name a few) would all be of direct benefit to the Peruvian forces facing the insurgency. The Peruvians must initiate "small patrols of well-trained men who could penetrate rugged terrain to gather intelligence, kill guerrillas, disrupt food gathering and courier traffic, call down artillery or air strikes where appropriate, and above all, make contacts with the population."¹¹

In providing training and advisors, however, the United States must be careful not to take on responsibility for the fight against the insurgency. It would be considered unwise to allow American military personnel into the "field" to operate with Peruvian military or militia or to inundate the Peruvian military with US personnel. LTCOL Lansdale's policy (in the 1950s) in the Philippines of refusing to allow American advisors to "operate" in the counter-insurgency was prudent and effective.



The Agency for International Development (AID) plays an active role in Peru today providing resources for development projects in agriculture, medicine, the encouragement of private enterprise and in institutional development. Infrastructure assistance from health care, building schools and improving transportation systems, aid in the promotion of democratic institutions such as the justice system, agricultural extension programs and many other initiatives are of vital importance to Peru's war against the Sendero Luminoso. Again, the US is not the only country in the world in whose interest a secure Peru lies. There are many options for assistance to Peru, but unless great strides in providing security for these initiatives are made, there will be no point in attempting to provide this assistance.

American aid may come in the form of security assistance and arms transfer programs. As has been discussed, in Peru's case this may prove difficult, but it is necessary. While it is not considered in the best interest of Peru to provide them with high-tech weapons, armor or advanced aircraft, it is necessary to assist them in procuring small arms, uniforms, training and transportation assets that provide mobility. Funding under the International Military Education and Training program can be particularly beneficial.

Much of the total aid package or assistance will come out of funds administered by the Department of State, such as the Economic Support Fund or other US civilian agencies. The United



States can cushion the effects of the government's deficit and help the government to avoid total economic collapse. In that sense, it may even allow the Peruvian government to provide the military pay necessary to properly man and equip a motivated and effective force through the use of Peruvian assets. US military equipment and training can give substantial support to the government in building a more effective military establishment. Without US aid the Peruvian government may not be able to undertake the reforms necessary to help it win the battle for popular support.

One of Peru's most significant economic woes is an sustained lack of foreign capital being invested in the local economy. Much of this is due to past policies such as nationalization of foreign companies which has kept further investment to a minimum. The government must take measures to attract foreign investment and nurture what little exists today and the US, especially through international forums, can help to encourage progress.

The Peruvian government must realize that the insurgents are waging a total war and they may have to take some measures which run counter to true democratic principles. The free press, unrestrained by government, may not serve in the best interests of the government and selected Sendero publications may have to be shut down. Publicity is a powerful weapon and thus far, the Sendero has used it more effectively than the government. Maintenance of the social order requires population control by either side and some democratic rights may have to be suspended



by the government during revolutionary periods. The battle against government corruption may require just these kind of suspensions of rights. If required, however, it must be done with great care and detailed explanations to the people regarding the necessity of suspending constitutional rights.

Measures of effectiveness in an advanced insurgency are a difficult question. By what measure does a government know if it is having a positive impact on defeating the insurgency? Undoubtedly the United States learned from the Vietnam War that simply counting dead bodies is not an effective way of assessing progress or success nor is any measure, standing alone, adequate to measure progress. The measures of progress in Peru have to reflect the fact that the "center of gravity" in this struggle is the loyalty of the population to either side. Perhaps the measures will take into account the number of immunizations provided, the degree that garbage collection occurred, improved unemployment rates, the decrease in guerrilla terror incidents (they may actually increase, however, as the government becomes increasingly effective against the insurgency) or the number of villages provided with adequate levels of security and assistance. But whatever the measures, they will have to reflect progress on social, economic, political and military terms.



CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS

The counter-insurgency (and counter-narcotics) efforts in Peru require a blend of largely economic, law enforcement, political, social and military policies and reforms. The best, and only prudent, assistance the US can provide is to help Peru eliminate the root causes that have nourished a thriving insurgency and flourishing coca economy. "This is a war of administration."¹² The side that best provides the basic infrastructure required to feed, cloth, shelter and protect the population will win and Sendero's actions have struck at the heart of popular confidence in the government's ability to maintain public order.¹³

In Peru, what the insurgency has thus far done so well by consolidating its cause, its catalyst (leadership) and a basis of support must be duplicated and improved on by the government and the military. Ultimately, Peru must strengthen itself; the US can only be of assistance. "Foreign aid can only be a catalyst, and not a solution in itself. It can stabilize an economy, but the long-term investment in a society must be generated overwhelmingly from within."¹⁴

Strategy and policy within the Peruvian government (and American) must be matched and appropriate. The strategies go after the root problems of the populace, allowing for renewed confidence in the government and the military. To successfully fight a home territory insurgency, allegiance of the peasants



must shift from the guerrillas to the government.

The aims of the Peruvian government and the United States (or any supporter) must be made clear. To paraphrase Clausewitz, no one should contemplate war without first being clear in his mind what he want to achieve and how he intends to achieve it. The Peruvian government has not yet successfully countered the conditions fostering the popular support of the Sendero. The conditions of the peasants have to change for the government to survive.

Chances for Peruvian (and American) success against the Sendero insurgency can be best summed up in terms of a partnership, based on friendship, respect and equality. This, however, is no easy task (especially in the case of Peru) and will take years of dedicated effort. In assisting countries fighting internal insurgencies, foreign powers (Americans) must trust the indigenous government (and withhold support for those which cannot be trusted), allow them to form their own solutions to their own problems with a minimum of interference and always treat them as equals. As Maj. Gen. Lansdale so aptly put it in discussing the 1950 Huk rebellion in the Philippines after it had been defeated, "the Filipinos best knew the problems, best knew how to solve them, and did it -- with US aid and advice, but without US domination of their efforts".¹⁵



NOTES

1. Anthony C. E. Quainton, US Ambassador to Peru, Lecture presented at USAID, Lima, Peru: August, 1990.
2. Anthony C. E. Quainton, US Ambassador to Peru, "The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the Future of Hemisphere Relations," Address presented to the National Exporters' Society, Lima, Peru: October, 1990.
3. Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1990), p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. Ibid., p 22.
6. Ibid., p 35.
7. Luis Arce Bonja, "Interview with A. Guzman," El Diario, Lima, Peru, 24 July 1988, p. 7.
8. David Chaplin. Peruvian Nationalism, A Corporatist Revolution. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books INC, 1976), p. 461.
9. Professor Chris Harmon. Lecture at the Naval War College, Newport R.I.: November 1991.
10. Christopher C. Harmon, "Illustrations of Learning in Counterinsurgency" in Comparative Strategy, Vol II, (London; Taylor and Francis, 1992), p. 31.
11. Ibid., p. 36.
12. Professor John D. Waghelstein. Lecture at the Naval War College, Newport R.I.: February 1992.
13. McCormick, p. 30.
14. Richard E. Bissell, "Who Killed the Third World?", The Washington Quarterly, Fall 1990.
15. MAJ Lawrence M. Greenberg, USA, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines: 1946-1955. (Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1986), p. 46.



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